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THE NEED FOR CENTRALIZED 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
KAREN M. SMITH 
Abstract: Developing a system of securities regulation in the 
European Union has been a difficult task. Currently, markets 
are regulated at the national level and are guided by certain 
minimum standards established by EU Directives. The 
Investment Services Directive, enacted in 1996, was heralded as 
the final piece of legislation required to complete a unified 
market for securities. This Note discusses the lSD's failure to 
result in a fully integrated market and concludes that EU 
markets need supervision by a centralized regulatory body to 
allow them to become fully integrated. 
INTRODUCTION 
One prominent goal in the establishment of the European Union 
(EU) was the facilitation of economic growth and economic coopera-
tion among European states. The European Commission (Commis-
sion) recognizes that financial services, which currently represent 6% 
of EU Cross Domestic Product (CDP) and 2.45% of employment, are 
an instrumental part of the European economy.l It is apparent that 
the EU needs a system whereby business opportunities are accessible 
across borders and investors are protected.2 As a result, EU legislation 
seeking to achieve fair and equal access to capital markets has tar-
geted the securities industry.3 
] Financial Servi(('s: Buildillg a Fmlllf'lilori! for Arlioll, al http://('mopa.('u.int/comm/ 
dg15/en/financ('s/gennal/fsen.pdf (last visit('d D('c ,~, 2000) [h('r('inaftel' Fralllf'loDlIi for 
Actiollj. 
2 E. Waid(' ''''arne]', kflltllal RProgllitioll and Oms-Border Fillallrial SPrllices in the Ellroj)f{{n 
Call/III u lIitv, 55 LA'" & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1992) ("[Ijlltegratioll of the Community's 
financial services markets ... can he expected to spur comp('tition among financial illt('r-
mediaries, inn-ease effici(,IKv in th(' financial services industry, provide ... securities im'('s-
tors with greater choice, and reduce the cost of capital for horrowers and issuers."). 
3 See Manning Gilbert WaIT(,Il, The Euroj)f{{n l 'Ilion's fillIPs/111m/ Services Directive, 15 U. 
PA . .J.INT'LBus.L. 181, 191 (1994). 
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Maintaining fairness and stability of markets in the EU is not an 
easy task.4 There are currently forty regulated securities markets 
throughout the twelve Member States that operate without the guid-
ance of any kind of supranational regulatory body.5 Instead, each 
Member State's national government regulates its securities markets 
in accordance with EU Directives.6 These Directives set baseline re-
quirements and minimum standards in areas such as issuance of 
stock, prospectus requirements and, most recently, the ability of firms 
to provide investment services to cross-border customers once the 
finn has gained authorization to do business in its own Member 
State.7 
The most recent Directive, with which Member States were re-
quired to comply by January 1, 1996, is the Investment Services Direc-
tive (ISD). The ISD represents a significant progression toward mar-
ket accessibility throughout the EU.8 Developments of the last few 
years, however, show that more rigid supranational regulation may be 
necessary before the markets of the EU are fully cooperative.9 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of earlier Directives 
in order to illustrate that the ISD does represent a major shift in the 
EU's approach to regulating market accessibility. Part II outlines the 
lSD's goals and its most important provisions. Part III explores recent 
developments in the financial services industry that call for updated 
regulation, and then points to the areas where the ISD falls short in 
dealing with those developments. Finally, Part IV concludes that the 
EU ultimately will need a centralized regulatory body to deal specifi-
cally with the securities industry because the current system simply 
cannot keep pace with developments in this area. 
1. EARLY REGULATION OF SECURITIES IN THE EU 
Historically, securities regulation has been noticeably absent 
throughout Europe's markets, making the EU's attempts at regulation 
4 ld. at 185-86. 
5 ld. at 191. 
6 ld. at 187. 
7 ld. at 187-92. 
8 Warren, supra note 3, at 1 ~t~; see generally Council Directive 9:~/22, 1993 OJ. (L 141), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/ em-lex/ cn/lif/ dati 1993/ en_'~93L0022.htlJll (last visited 
Dec. 3, 1999). 
9 See generalZv Fmmewor/{ for Artioll, slljna note 1; Financial Services: Implementing the 
Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COl\I(99)2:~2 final, (It http://emopa.l'lI. 
inti comm/internal_market/ en/fin,mcl's/ general! actionen.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 
2000) [hereinafter Action Plan I. 
2000] Centralized SecllIities Regualtion 207 
extremely challenging. lO Amid vague rules, self-interested weak regu-
latory bodies and, in some countries, cultures of non-disclosure, mar-
kets were easily manipulated and thus were easy targets for those who 
wanted to take advantage ofthem.ll 
The EU's effort to equalize market access has followed the same 
procedure as in other areas of legislation-the Council issues Direc-
tives setting standards for Member State legislation, and then allows 
each Member State to create its own laws that comply with these Di-
rectives.12 The last twenty years have seen significant legislation in the 
securities area. 13 Initially, the Commission established rules that ad-
dressed specific issues such as how stock is issued and what informa-
tion must be provided to investors to ensure fair dealing-that is, the 
rules of the game.I4 In contrast, the most recent Directive, the lSD, 
focused more explicitly on accessibility-that is, who can play.I5 
The earlier Directives merely required Member States to meet 
common standards within their own borders.I6 For example, the 1979 
Admissions Directive required Member State legislation to establish 
baseline listing requirements for companies issuing securities, includ-
ing requirements that the issuer has published financial statements 
for the preceding three years, that the securities listed are freely nego-
tiable, and tlIat the securities are sufficiently distributed to permit a 
market.17 
Other Directives focused even more closely on disclosure re-
quirements. For example, the Information Directive of 1980 required 
that companies listed on any EU exchange file certain "listing particu-
lars. "18 These include the name of the person responsible for prepar-
ing the information required by the Directive and for auditing finan-
10 Warren, sujn"a note 3, at 185-86. 
II Id. ("Insidel- trading in Europe has been reganled as a m,yor tenet of trading strat-
egy in the EU's seClu-ities mal-kets. and may explain why comparatively few Europeans are 
direct owners of equities. "). 
12 Id. at 187. 
13 See id. at 187-92. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 193. 
16 Manning Gilbert Warren, Global Harlllonization of SeCll1ities Laws: The Achievements of 
IheEurojJean Communities, 31 HARv. INT'L LJ. 185. 191-92 (1990) [hereinafter Hannoniza-
lion]. 
17 Council Directive 79/279. arts. 1-22. 1979 OJ. (L 66) 21. allailnble at http://europa. 
eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/datlI979L0279.html (last visited Dec. 3 1999); ''''arren, supra note 
3, at 187; Harmonization, slljJm note 16, at 210. 
18 Council Directive 80/390. arts. 1-4, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1, available at http://europa. 
eu.int/ eur-Iex/ en/lif/ dati 1980L0390.html (last visited Dec. 3. 1999). 
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cial statements, the capitalization of the issuer, the issuer's principal 
business activities, the issuer's assets and liabilities, its financial posi-
tion, profits and losses, the issuer's management, and its prospects for 
the coming year.19 Similarly, the Interim Reports Directive of 1982 re-
quired that all companies issuing stock publish biannual reports (with 
explanatory statements) on activities, profits, and 10sses.2o Finally, the 
Prospectus Directive of 1989 established requirements for what in-
formation companies must publish in a prospectus.21 These publica-
tion requirements include the terms of the offer, the nature of the 
securities, withholding taxes, underwriting arrangements, transfer 
restrictions and preemptive rights, issuer's capitalization, issuer's 
business activities, issuer's material contracts, patents and licenses, 
legal proceedings, issuer's annual and interim financial statements, 
issuer's business trends, and prospects for the current year. 22 
In 1985, similar standards were established for mutual funds. The 
Mutual Funds Directive set guidelines for supervision, structure, ac-
tivities, and disclosure requirements for mutual funds, and also per-
mitted marketing of mutual funds throughout the EU upon authori-
zation by anyone Member State.23 Other legislation included the 
Majority Shareholdings Directive of 1988 which ensured disclosure of 
the extent of shareholders' voting rights,24 and the Insider Trading 
Directive of 1989 which prohibited trading on the basis of non-public 
material information.25 
All of these laws were helpful in beginning to structure a more 
uniform system of regulation. One commentator noted that they "es-
tablished a far-reaching regulatory framework for implementation by 
19 fd.; see also \Varren, sltjJl"a note 3, at 187; Harmonization, supra note 16, at 212 (not-
ing exemptions for some information in certain situations). 
20 Council Directive 82/121, arts. 2-4, 1982 OJ. (L 48) 26, available at http://europa. 
eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lif/ dat/ 1982/ en_382L0121.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); Warren, 
supra note 3, at 187. 
21 Council Directive 89/298, arts. 1-26, 1989 OJ. (L 124) 8, available at http://europa. 
eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lit; dati 1989/ en_'~89L0298.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); Warren, 
supra note 3, at 189. 
22 fd. 
23 Council Directive 85/611. arts. 1-59, 1985 OJ. (L 375) 3, available at http://www. 
europa.eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lit} dati 1985/ en_385L0611.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); 
\\'arren, supra note ,~, at 188. 
24 Council Dil'ective 88/627, arts. 1-18, 1988 OJ. (L 348) 62, available at http://www. 
europa.eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lit} dati 1988/ en_388L0627.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); 
\\'a1'1'en, supra note 3, at 189. 
25 Council Directh'e 89/592, arts. 1-12, 1989 OJ. (L 334) ,~O, available at http:/ / eu-
ropa.eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lif/ dati 1989/ en_389L0592.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); War-
ren, supra note 3, at 189. 
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the Member States, and ... an accessible, integrated marketplace."26 
However, although demanding similarity of laws among the Member 
States, the Directives did not facilitate or encourage cross-border 
transactions.27 Member States regulated the securities industry solely 
at the national level, requiring firms to adhere to the national stan-
dards existing in the Member State where the firms chose to conduct 
business.28 These arrangements left firms vulnerable to discriminatory 
regulation in foreign countries, and subjected them to the high costs 
of obtaining authorization by several governments.29 
The Commission first sought to alleviate these problems by 
adopting the Mutual Recognition Directive, which represented a shift 
from commonality to reciprocity.3o This 1987 legislation applied to 
issuers of stock and mutual funds, and amended several existing Di-
rectives. 31 It required that where an issuer complied with the laws es-
tablished by one Member State pursuant to an amended Directive, 
that compliance would be sufficient to comply with the rules of other 
Member States.32 In other words, if an issuer's listing particulars were 
approved by a competent authority in one Member State, they must 
be recognized in all other Member States without additional scru-
tiny.33 The ISD goes one step further by granting investment firms, 
not just issuers, a "passport" to do business in foreign Member 
States.34 
26 Warren, supra note 3, at 190-91. 
27 See Harmonization, supra note 16, at 190. 
28 ld. at 194. 
29 VI'arren, supra note 3, at 186. 
30 Council Directive 87/345, arts. 1-3, 1987 OJ (L 185) 81, available at http:/ / eu-
ropa/ eu.int/ eur-lex/ en/lif/ dati 1987/ en_387 /L0345.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999); 
Harmonization, supra note 16, at 191-92. 
31 Council Directive 87/345, slljJl"a note 30. 
321d. 
33 lei.; Harmol1ization, supra note 16, at 213 (noting that "listing particulars approved by 
a competent authority in one Member State must be recognized in all other Member 
States without further action or information requiI·ements ... even where more stringent 
disclosure requirements apply in the Memher State whe1·e recognition is sought."). 
34 See Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8. 
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II. THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE (ISD) 
A. Goals 
The ISD was adopted to foster the freedom of capital movement 
among EU members permitted by Article 57 of the Treaty of Rome.35 
The ISD "serves to protect investors and to facilitate the smooth func-
tioning of capital markets"36 by requiring mutual recognition of 
minimum standards for the activity of investment firms across Mem-
ber States' borders, rather than by requiring strict harmonization of 
laws.37 It is now possible for an investment firm to conduct business 
throughout the EU after obtaining authorization in just one Member 
State.38 The notion of the "Single Market" has been extended to the 
financial services arena.39 
An additional goal of the ISD was the prevention of protectionist 
regulatory discrimination against outsiders.40 Prior to the lSD, some 
Member States unfairly excluded foreign investment firms from com-
petition.41 In E. C. Commission v. Italy, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) recognized that Italy's exclusion of firms not registered in Italy 
fell squarely within the bounds of the ISD.42 The court held that this 
exclusion was precisely the type of discrimination that the Directive 
was intended to prevent.43 Because the situation arose before imple-
mentation of the lSD, the ECJ decided in favor of the Commission on 
other grounds, namely that Italy had failed to fulfill its obligations 
under Articles 52 and 59 of the Maastricht Treaty.44 Thus, Italy was 
required to open its doors to foreign investment firms.45 
35 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 
(1992), [1992]1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992); Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8. 
36 Uwe H. Scheidel~ C1VSS Border Compliance: Organizational Ditties Imposed o-n National 
and International Investment Firms, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT 
SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 73, 73 (Guido FelTarini ed., 1998). 
37 Warren, supra note 3, at 194. 
38 Id. 
39 See general{v Completing the Internal Market: ""'hite Paper from the Commission to 
the European Council, COM(85)310 final. 
40 Harmonization, supra note 16, at 189-90. 
41 See generally Case C-lOl/94, EC Commission v. Italy (Re Restrictions on Foreign Se-
curities Dealers), [1996] E.CJ. 6263, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 754, 783 (1996) (deciding that 
Italian laws unfairly rest.-icted the activity of dealing in transferable secmities to companies 
or firms whose registered offices weloe in Italy). 
42 Id. at 757. 
43/d. 
BId. at 778. 
45/d. at 780 (concluding that "the obligation for operatol"s from other Member States 
to set up their p.-incipal establishment in Italy is the very negation of the freedom to pro-
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The ISD also seeks to reduce compliance costs for investment 
firms operating in the ED by requiring authorization only in one 
Member State.46 Before the Directive, investment firms were subject to 
the unnecessary financial burden imposed by having to seek approval 
in every Member State in which they wanted to conduct business.47 
B. Provisions 
The ISD applies generally to anyone in the business of providing 
investment services.48 Such services include "brokerage, dealing, mar-
ket making, portfolio management, underwriting a distribution of 
securities, individual investment advice, and safekeeping and admini-
stration."49 The Directive's key provisions include Home State 
authorization, mutual recognition, prudential regulation, conduct-of-
business rules, and exchange membership for foreign investment 
firms. 50 
Home State authorization is the process by which an investment 
firm obtains permission to provide services in the Member State in 
which it principally conducts business (Home State) .51 It requires that 
the firm have a main office located in the Member State where it is 
seeking authorization, and that the firm have sufficient initial capi-
tal.52 In addition, the firm's managers must show "sufficiently good 
repute" and "sufficient experience" in the securities industry.53 Finally, 
the firm must submit a business plan and disclose the identities of any 
shareholders or members who have "qualifying holdings. "54 
Mutual recognition is the process by which finns receive pennis-
sion to conduct business in Member States other than the ones that 
have granted them authorization (Host State).55 In order to conduct 
business in another Member State, a finn must notify its Home State 
vide sel'vices, and does not constitute a condition which is indispensable for achie\'ing 
those aims."). 
46 'Narren, sujJra note 3, at 186. 
47Id. 
48 Council Directive 93/22, sujJra note 8, art. 1 (2); see also 'Varner, sujJra note 2, at 14. 
49,",'arner, supra note 2, at 14. 
50 Council Dil'ective 93/22, supra note 8; Sf'e WalTen, sujJra note 3, at 198-217. 
51 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, arts. 3-6. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54 Council Directive 93/22, slt/Jra note 8, art. 1 (10) (defining "qualii)'ing holdings" as 
"any direct or indirect holding in an investment finn which repI'esents 10% or more of the 
capital or of the voting rights or which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence 
over the management of the investment firm in which that holding subsists."). 
55 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, art. 17; Warren, supra 110te 3, at 201. 
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that it wishes to do SO.56 Within three months, the Home State must 
relay that information to the Host State.57 Within two months, the 
Host State must prepare for the supervision of the firm and then po-
tify the firm of the conditions upon which it is authorized to conduct 
business.58 If, however, those two months pass without communication 
from the Host State to the firm, the firm can establish its branch of-
fice in the Host State and commence business.59 
The "prudential rules" established by the ISD prescribe specific 
safeguards that firms must have in place in order to ensure that they 
are complying with the regulations.60 These include sound adminis-
trative and accounting procedures, controls and safeguards over elec-
tronic data processing, adequate internal control mechanisms, segre-
gation of accounts, records of all transactions, and procedures to 
minimize the risk of conflicts of interest.61 In addition, the conduct-of-
business rules demand the following in day-to-day business: honesty 
and fairness, due skill, care and intelligence, and the employment of 
resources and procedures necessary for proper performance of busi-
ness activities.62 Firms also must obtain information from clients about 
their financial positions and investment experiences and objectives, 
avoid conflicts of interest, and comply with all regulatory require-
ments.63 
Finally, the ISD requires that Member States allow investment 
firms to become members of their stock exchanges,54 and also pro-
vides for more transparency in stock trading.65 Transparency is 
achieved through publication at the open of the previous day's prices, 
as well as publication throughout the day of prices at no more than a 
one-hour delay.66 
III. HAS THE ISD BEEN EFFECTIVE? 
Upon adoption, the ISD was hailed as the cornerstone of EU se-
cm"ities regulation and was said to complete "the final piece of frame-




60 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, an. 10. 
61 [d. 
62 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, art. 11. 
631d. 
64 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, an. 15. 
65 Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, an. 21. 
66ld. 
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work legislation needed for a Single Market in financial services. "67 
However, there are reasons why the ISD has not resolved more com-
pletely the issue of EU-wide securities regulation. 
The first problems encountered dealt with implementation.68 
The ISD was adopted in 1993, and Member States had three years to 
tailor their own securities legislation to meet the new standards set by 
the DirectiYe.69 At the original effectiYe date of implementation, how-
e\'er, only four countries had fully implemented the Directive.70 As of 
August 1997, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, and parts of the U.K 
were still lagging. 71 More recently, in June 1998, the U.K's failure to 
comply persisted.72 On June 19, 1998, EU Financial Services Commis-
siOller Mario Monti announced that "the [ISD] is not yet fully imple-
mented in all Member States, although considerable progress has 
been made."73 
A second problem is that regulatory discrimination was not 
eradicated completely even where Member States seem to have com-
plied with the ISD.74 In October 1999, for example, the Commission 
discovered that Italy had enacted a law in 1997 that granted reduced 
tax rates to issuers for the first three years that their securities were 
listed on Italian regulated markets.75 The Commission decided that 
67 SeCltrities Mathets: ISD Gets Final Go Ahead, EUR, REP" May 12, 1993, allailable at 1993 
WL 2492020. 
68 See Commissioll Kt'I'jJing a H't7I)' Eyl' on Greell Stocll Aiarllet Rult's, EUR. REp., Feb. 12, 1997 
available at 1997 WL 8515531; Eddy WYlIleersch, Tht' ImfJlnnelltation oj tllP LSD and CAD, ill 
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SER\'ICES DIRECTI\'E AND BEYOND 30, 
30 (Guido FeITarini ed., 1998); Commission pI/mit's in{linge1l/i'llt jJrocl'f(lings against Belgiu1l/, 
S/){/in, and tht' l'nited Kingdom, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgI5/cn/finances/ 
infr /19.htm (last \'isited Dec 3, 1999). 
69 Council Directive 93/22, sujna note 8, art. 31 ("No later than I July 1995 l\lember 
States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary for them to 
comply with this Directive. These provisions shall enter into force no later than 31 Decem-
ber 1995."). 
70 Wymeersch, slljJm note 68, at 30. 
71 Commission Kel'j1ing a H't71} Eye all Greeh Stach lV1mkt't RI/lt's, sI/j1m note 68; C01l/1IIission 
pll1:511es inftingement j1roct'eding.l' against Belgium, Sjlaill, and the United Kingdom, supm note 68. 
72 C01llmission pursues infringement jJroce('(lings against Bdgil/m, 51)([in, and tht' United King-
dom, sll/lm note 68. 
73 Mario Monti, Com/lleting the Singh' i\IImtwt Legislation, INT'L l\IONEY MARKETING, June 
19, 1999, aI/ailable at 1999 'NL 9958487; set' Fifteenth Annual Report on Commission Moni-
toring of the Application of Comlllllllity Law, COM(98rn 7 final at 219 (OJ C250) (identi-
fying Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain as the only Member States not 
to implement measures of 93/22). 
71 See Financial Sefllic('s: III{lillgt'lI/ent Procet'dillgs Agaillst Frallce & Italv in the Field of Stach 
Exchanges, at http://europa.int!comm/dg15/en/finances/infr/99-755.htm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 1999). 
75 Id. 
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such a "measure is likely to discourage issuers from having their secu-
rities listed on the stock markets in other Member States and moreo-
ver constitutes discrimination on the basis of nationality. "76 
Another shortcoming is that the ISD sets up the framework to 
allow investment firms to conduct business not in all Member States, 
but only in those Member States in which they have established 
branch offices.77 It does not take into account the potential for any 
increased cross-border business that may occur if firms were allowed 
to market themselves from a distance (that is, without setting up a 
branch office).78 The Commission has proposed an additional Direc-
tive to allow such transactions, highlighting the fact that the ISD is not 
the final answer. 79 The impetus for this legislation is largely the devel-
opment of electronic means, such as the Internet.8o However, the new 
laws would encompass marketing by telephone or mail as well.81 
The framework of EU securities regulation faces additional chal-
lenges such as the emergence of alternative trading systems, the un-
certainty of redress for individual investors, the lack of uniformity of 
taxation, and large disparity in pricing.82 Each of these issues presents 
an obstacle to a fully integrated market, and each must be addressed 
quickly. The lSD, however, provides no resolution for any of them. 
In October 1998, the Commission recognized that integration of 
the EU's securities markets was not yet a reality.83 As a result, it pub-
lished "Building a Framework for Action," which outlined remaining 
challenges to a fully integrated market for securities.84 Among the is-
76Id. 
77 See Council Directive 93/22, supra note 8, art. 17. 
78 See id. 
79 Amended Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
Concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services, COM (99) 385 final 
[hereinafter Proposed Distance Selling Directive l. 
80 Id. The proposal seeks to facilitate the development of innovative forms of trade in 
financial services by guaranteeing: (1) a warming up period before a consumer agrees to a 
contract; (2) the consumer's right of withdrawal under specified circumstances; (3) the 
supplier's rights; (4) prohibition on providing services that have not been requested; and 
(5) limitations on "coltl<alling." See id. 
81Id. 
82 Action Plan, supra note 9, at 6, 10, 15; Framework for Action, supra note 1, at 13. 
Commissions, the amount paid by investors to brokers pel' transaction, are extremely di-
vergent among the Member States. Fmmework for Action, supra note 1, at 13. For in-
stance, the commission on a purchase or sale worth 1'440 ECU (European Currency 
Units) in Ireland isjust 3 ECU.Id. In Finland, the same transaction demands a commission 
of 51 ECU, seventeen times more. Id. 
83 See generally Framework for Action, supra note 1. 
84 See generalZY ill. 
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sues discussed were the need for a "leaner and more effective regula-
tory apparatus," the persistent barriers to cross-border retail transac-
tions, and the need for more cooperation among the EU's existing 
regulatory bodies.85 To address these issues, the Commission estab-
lished the Financial Services Policy Group (FSPG) to develop a plan 
for attacking these issues.86 
From January 1999 through March 1999, the FSPG met to ac-
complish its dual goals of (1) identifYing and prioritizing a set of ac-
tions, and (2) defining a number of immediate priorities.87 The 
Group was composed of representatives of EU Finance Ministers and 
was chaired by Mario Monti (the EU's Financial Services Commis-
sioner).88 The Commission asked the FSPG to discuss four specific 
areas: (l) where new legal initiatives are required; (2) where existing 
provisions need to be adapted to new developments; (3) where exist-
ing provisions need simplification; and (4) where existing provisions 
need to be more coherent.89 
At its first meeting, the Group identified immediate priorities 
such as approving existing proposals and improving existing legisla-
tion.90 The second meeting focused on expediting the legislative pro-
cess and on the issue of e-commerce in the financial services con-
text.91 At its final meeting, the FSPG discussed the status of current 
supervisory structures and the international aspect of supervision.92 
The conclusions reached by the FSPG are detailed in the Com-
mission's Financial Services Action Plan (Action Plan). 93 This report 
describes a course of action that may resolve the remaining obstacles 
to full integration of the EU's securities markets.94 A projected time-
line and delegation of duties are also outlined.95 The theme of the 
Action Plan is that the current system cannot keep pace with the de-
85 /d. at 6-8,13-17, and 18-20. 
86Id. at 3. 
87 First Meeting of Financial Servia's Poli(y (;roll/I. at http://ellmpa.t:'1I.int/comm/dgI5/ 




91 Financial Services Policy Gl'OlljJ~')ero1/d Meeting. at http://europa.ell.int/comm/cigI5/ 
en/finances/generalj87.htlll (last visited Dec. 3, 1999). 
92 Financial Services Policy Group-Third Meeting;. at http://ellmpa.ell.int/comm/cigI5/ 
en/finances/generaljfspg.htm (last dsited Dec. 3, 1999). 
93 See gl'11eral~v Action Plan, supra note 9. 
94 See gel1l'ralll' id. 
95 See gl'11eralll' id. 
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velopments in the financial services field. 96 The bottom line of the 
group's analysis is that "the ISD is in urgent need of upgrading if it is 
to serve as the cornerstone of an integrated securities market. "97 The 
present structure of securities regulation in the EU is not capable of 
responding to quickly evolving needs.98 
IV. MOVING TOWARDS STRICTER SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION 
If the status quo is not strong enough to handle the demands of a 
rapidly-evolving marketplace, then it needs to change. The current 
state of securities regulation in the EU is insufficient. At the time of its 
adoption, the ISD seemed sufficient to introduce and encourage 
cross-border securities transactions. In reality, however, it is stagnant 
legislation that does not go far enough.99 The Commission plans to 
publish a Green Paper during 2000 as a "wide-ranging review of ISD 
as the basis for integrated and efficient market for investment serv-
ices. "100 What the EU really needs is a strong supranational regulatory 
body to uniformly enforce securities laws throughout the Member 
States. The Commission's recent actions, such as forming the FSPG, 
and further reliance in the Forum of European Securities Commis-
sions (FESCO) indicate that it is beginnit~g to recognize such a 
need.1Ol 
Centralized securities regulation is necessary for two reasons. 
Foremost, the Commission needs to be able to act more quickly in 
response to changing markets.102 Second, absent centralized regula-
tion, cooperation among several distinct regulatory bodies is nearly 
impossible to achieve. l03 
The legislative process adopted by the EU is inefficient in the 
context of securities regulation because it moves too slowly,l04 Cur-
rently, it can take three to four years for legislative procedures to be 
completed, and upon completion they often respond only to isolated 
96 See generally irl. 
97 frl. at 5. 
98 See Action Plan, supra note 9, at I G. 
99 See id. 
100 [d. at 2'~. 
101 See id. at I G. 
102 See generalZY id. 
103 See Roberta S. Kannel, The Case for a European Sew/ilies COli/mission, 38 COLVM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 34 (1999). 
104 See Action Plan, sllI)/'a note 9, at 4 ("Several proposals of immediate and significant 
relevance to the functioning of EU financial markets have faJlen victim to protracted po-
litical deadlock. "). 
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issues. l05 The Commission describes the current system as "piecemeal 
and reactiYe," an approach that will not suffice in the context of "fi-
nancial senices [that] are being steadily blurred. "106 The EU needs a 
proactive authority that looks at the entire industry, rather than at 
particular problems, and is thus able to eliminate delays in responses 
to issues. l07 
The second problem is merely one of too many cooks in the 
kitchen. lOS Roberta Kannel, Professor of International Business Law at 
Brooklyn Law School and a former Commissioner of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), notes that "transferring oversight 
of the self-regulatory process to fifteen different national securities 
regulators will not result in a pan-European securities market, but 
rather will compound the problems of a fragmented system for the 
trading and regulation of securities. "109 By contrast, a single authority 
with the power to make decisions on an EU-wide basis would ensure 
uniformity oflegislation, as well as consistent interpretation of laws. no 
Recently, the Commission has begun to ask for the help of securi-
ties regulators throughout the EU and has facilitated cooperation by 
different national regulators through groups such as the FSPG,111 The 
Commission also anticipates intensifYing its collaboration with 
FESCO.1l2 Additionally, the Commission plans to develop a union-
wide complaint network-a centralized forum where violations of se-
ctIl,ities laws can be reported,1l3 
These plans demonstrate that the EU needs a centralized regula-
tory system, not only to hear complaints but to act on them.1l4 The 
EU needs to establish a regulatory body that would address problems 
on a more permanent, continual basis, rather than by means of the ad 
hoc forums that are currently used.1l5 
105 fd. at 17; see Kannel, sujJra note 103, at 33 ("Solving ... problems through the proc-
ess of fonnulating Directives is impractical. It takes too long for directives to be negotiated 
and then implemented. The capital markets are creative and dynamic. "). 
106 Action Plan, supra note 9, at IG. 
107 See id. 
108 See Karmel, sujJra note 103, at 34. 
109 fd. (noting additionally that future dealings with non-EU securities regulators will 
be more likely if one regulatory body repl'esents the entire EU). 
llO See id. 
III See generally First Meeting ofFinancia/ Sfl'llices Po/il')' GroIlP. sUj}l'a note 87. 
ll2 Action Plan, supra note 9, at G. 
ll3 !d. at 10. 
ll4 See id. 
ll5 See id. 
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The Commission has been reluctant to establish a permanent 
committee without regulatory authority to address securities issues, as 
has been created in the banking and insurance sectors.116 Similarly, its 
language regarding centralized regulation remains cautious.117 How-
ever, the Action Plan conceded that" [t] he EU has been hamstrung by 
the absence of a committee of appropriate standing to assist the EU 
institutions in the developing and implementing regulation for in-
vestment services and securities markets. "118 The EU needs to create 
such a structure that can more comprehensively and more efficiently 
oversee the securities markets of the EU. 
CONCLUSION 
The ISD represents a significant step towards a more accessible 
European securities market because it facilitates the cross-border ac-
tivities of investment firms. However, it is merely a first step in inte-
grating the securities markets and in achieving the goals of investor 
protection and efficient functioning of markets. 
The cornerstone of securities regulation in the EU cannot be 
stagnant. It cannot rest on its laurels while the securities industry rap-
idly evolves. If the EU wants to reach full integration, it must develop 
a stronger foundation that encourages flexibility and a proactive ap-
proach to regulation. That foundation can be developed by creating a 
regulatory body that will address the needs of European securities 
markets and European investors. 
116 At various times the EU has discussed the creation of a securities committee. See Se-
nilities Committee: Proposal Hits Bottolll in COllciliation, EUR. REp., Feb. 14, 1998, available at 
1998 Wi. 8800549, (discussing recent clash between Council and Parliament over 1996 
proposal for securities committee); SecllIities: Divergent Sentiments on EU COlllmittee Proposal, 
EUR. REP., Mar. 9, 1996, available at 1996 Wi. 8662208. 
117 See Action Plan, supra note 9, at 13. ("There are reasons to believe that the status 
quo lIlay not be tenable over the longer-term. There is now a greater need and a willing-
ness to engage in an open discussion on the structures that will be needed to ensure ap-
propriate regulation and supervision of a single financial market. ... In tillle, the option 
of a single authority to oversee securities markets supervision lIlay emerge as a meaningful 
proposition in the light of changing market reality."). 
118 Id. at 14. 
